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Abstract— Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are playing 
important roles in the critical infrastructure now. A prominent 
family of CPSs are networked control systems in which the 
control and feedback signals are carried over computer 
networks like the Internet. Communication over insecure 
networks make system vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this 
article, we design an intrusion detection and compensation 
framework based on system/plant identification to fight covert 
attacks. We collect error statistics of the output estimation 
during the learning phase of system operation and after that, 
monitor the system behavior to see if it significantly deviates 
from the expected outputs. A compensating controller is further 
designed to intervene and replace the classic controller once the 
attack is detected. The proposed model is tested on a DC motor 
as the plant and is put against a deception signal amplification 
attack over the forward link. Simulation results show that the 
detection algorithm well detects the intrusion and the 
compensator is also successful in alleviating the attack effects.  
Keywords— Cyber physical system, intrusion detection, covert, 
service degradation attack, cyber security, system identification. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) are known to be an integral 
part of the future Industry 4.0. They are a composition of cyber 
and physical entities and mostly use computer networks to 
control and interconnect the physical components. There are 
many CPS examples ranging from autonomous vehicles [1,2] 
to electric power grids [3], medical robots [4], and water 
distribution networks [5].  
  The inclusion network in the CPS paradigm introduces 
new forms of threat as it brings its inherent vulnerabilities 
along. Attacks on cyber physical systems could cause 
damages, and in the case of Industry 4.0, even create a cascade 
of failures which further boost the attack effect. A prominent 
category of the CPS family is network control systems. The 
advantages of using internet to connect controllers and 
physical plants has increased number of this kind of CPSs. 
However, remote controlling and remote sensing make system 
vulnerable to the threats in cyber domain, especially when ad 
hoc or unprotected networks are used for this purpose [6]. 
Numerous cyber incidents in safety-critical infrastructures 
have been reported in the last decade which drew the attention 
of researchers in the CPS field. The disaster caused by Stuxnet 
in 2010 [7], the power plant shutdown by cyber attack in 2008 
[8], and Georgia water treatment plant incident in 2013 [9] are 
just a few examples. 
The new cyber-physical systems suffer from some 
vulnerabilities which traditional control systems do not. 
Therefore, appropriate detection and compensation techniques 
are needed. Classic Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) were 
developed to detect anomalies in the cyber world, and usually 
over the network channel. They try to single out malicious 
packets using a set of distinguishing features. However, in 
CPS, a packet can carry a control signal which does not 
necessarily look harmful unless the system state is also 
included in the analysis. 
The authors in [27] give a taxonomy of CPS threats and 
define a class which is so called the “covert” attacks. In one of 
such attacks, the control signal is intercepted over the forward 
link and manipulated by the adversary to create either human-
invisible fluctuations in the plant operation or unnoticeable 
steady-state errors. Both of them target damaging the plant 
through Service Degradation (SD), one in a short period and 
the other over the long run. SD attack can be made more 
intelligent if adversary identifies controller and/or plant.  
This paper proposes a novel Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) which adopts the same system identification technique 
a smart adversary does, but to detect malicious interventions. 
First, during the initial immune phase of network operation, a 
Neural Network (NN) identifier is trained based on plant 
inputs and outputs. Then, it is used to predict the plant outputs 
for every control signal the controller generates. If the plant’s 
mathematical model is available, it can be equally used for the 
prediction purpose. This identifier will be a virtual model of 
the original system. The IDS module sits at the controller sider 
and collects error samples during the normal operation of the 
system. These samples specify normal deviation patterns of 
the estimated outputs from the actual outputs.  
After the immune/learning phase finishes, any unusual 
behavior which results in a significant deviation from the 
expected output raises the alarm. A compensating controller is 
then triggered by the IDS to get in the loop and intervene in 
order to mitigate the attack effect. We mainly focus on the 
stealth or covert attacks which aim to create overshoots [27]. 
 In order to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed method, 
a DC motor is picked as the test plant and some simulations 
were conducted using Simulink of Matlab and Truetime tools 
[10]. The results demonstrate that proposed method 
  
successfully detects covert amplification attacks. The 
compensator, which is an intelligent learning controller, also 
manages to reduce the impact of attacks compared to when 
there was no compensation involved.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The related 
works are given in Section 2. Section 3 gives a picture of the 
problem, especially from the cyber perspective. The proposed 
intrusion detection and compensation algorithms are 
presented in Section 4. Simulation results on the test CPS are 
reported in Section 5. The conclusion is made is Section 6. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The proliferation of cyber-physical attacks became a 
reality and security of them has received an increasing 
attention in the literature, especially after Stuxnet [6]. In this 
section, some works related to this subject are presented.  
General approaches have been proposed to detect 
intrusions in cyber-physical or IoT systems. For instance, in 
[18], an IDS, by using neural networks, was proposed to 
enhance the security of vehicular networks.  
The authors in [19] presented a specification-based IDS 
for Home Area Networks (HAN). Their IDS targeted ZigBee 
technology since ZigBee is dominant in HANs. Normal 
behavior of the network was defined through selected 
specifications and deviations from the defined normal 
behavior was deemed to be a sign of intrusion. In a similar 
study, the authors in [20] developed an algorithm that can 
monitor power flows and detect anomalies. Their algorithm 
uses principal component analysis to separate regular and 
irregular flow data. Analysis of the information in this 
subspace determines whether the power system data has been 
compromised or not. 
False data injection is a kind of deception attack that is 
launched as a man-in-the middle (MITM) attack. 
Respectively, in [21] and [22], false data injection attacks in 
electric power grids and wireless sensor networks are 
investigated. These studies describe a kind of attacker on 
CPSs that has information about both the physical system and 
the controller, which can potentially make them covert. Two 
queueing models are proposed to simulate the stochastic 
process of packet delay and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks  
in [23], while in [24], the authors have studied a scenario in 
which the attacker performs zero-dynamics attacks on the 
system. They tried to reveal stealth attacks for linear time 
invariant systems via monitoring. 
With a different approach, [25] presents three mechanisms 
for time-based intrusion detection in CPSs. It is suggested that 
the information obtained by timing analysis is used for 
intrusion detection. Bound checking of execution micro-
timings is adopted by application(s) to detect intrusions as a 
self test procedure. Alternatively, the IDS can be implemented 
on the embedded system OS scheduler.   
In an effort to classify the methods of securing cyber 
physical systems, the authors of [26] defined general 
frameworks and approaches that can be adopted to make CPSs 
more survivable. Among them there were solutions for robust 
networked control systems and fault tolerant control methods. 
However, this paper does not study any specific plant or attack 
scenario and merely provides general design guidelines.  
A covert attack for the purpose of service degradation was 
proposed in [27]. The goal was to investigate how these 
attacks decrease the performance of networked control 
systems. The authors claimed that the two attacks they 
designed were able to affect the system hardware, in a covert 
way. In their scheme, the attacker identifies both the plant and 
the controller first. Then, he determines what actions he can 
take to degrade or damage the system, either in a short period 
or over the long run. The short-time attack was designed to 
create a 50% overshoot on the system output and the long-
term service degradation attack aimed creating a noticeable 
steady state error. Both attacks targeted damaging the plant 
hardware, but in different ways. The idea was tested on an 
unprotected networked DC motor.  
III. THE CYBER ATTACK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 We assume having a networked control system with 
possible deception (unnoticed modification) attacks on the 
forward link packets, similar to [27]. This implies that the 
control signals are not protected well or the forward link key 
has been compromised [29]. The attacker aims to manipulate 
the control packets at some point of time. However, it is 
assumed that the system starts from a safe phase during which 
it is attack-free. This is a necessity for IDS error learning and 
identification purpose. We consider the amplification Service 
Degradation (SD) attack. This is a covert attack in which the 
adversary intercepts the network channel, modifies it and 
sends it through towards the rightful recipient. The 
manipulation is normally multiplication of the control signals 
by a fixed number.  
Reference [27] defines the intelligent version of this attack 
in which the attacker identifies the plant and the controller first 
and then applies a constant proportional gain in the forward 
link to create temporal overshoots as high as %50 of the 
nominal reference. Through repeated tries, the attacker aims 
to degrade the service and gradually damage the physical 
system or reduce the mean time between failures (MTBF). 
The difference between a DoS attack and a SD-Controlled 
attack is that the latter is not intended to disrupt the physical 
process in a short period. 
 In the subsequent sections, we will study the effect of this 
kind of intelligent attacks on the performance of a CPS. First, 
we design an intrusion detection system to capture such covert 
attacks. Under this adversarial model, it is assumed that the 
feedback link is safe. Therefore, when legitimate state changes 
happen at the plant side, the IDS will know and uses the 
corresponding reference error model learnt in the initial phase.  
 
IV. INTRUSION DETECTION AND COMPENSATION 
A. Intrusion Detection System 
The most important issues in dealing with CPS attacks are 
accuracy in detection (low false positives) and timely 
reactions.  The time between detection and reaction is critical 
to have a sustainable process. Early detections increase the 
chance of containing the attack. Fig. 1 shows the architecture.   
 
Fig. 1. The proposed IDS architecture for the networked control system. 
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Detector. To design the IDS, it is assumed that there exists 
an initial secure period for the CPS during which an identifier 
learns the plant dynamics (e.g. the equivalent transfer 
function). Attacks are (potentially) launched after Tattack.  
We design an intelligent identifier to model the CPS while 
it works normally in the safe phase. The identifier is an 
artificial neural network. The detection strategy proposed in 
this study is based on adaptive hard thresholds. IDS makes a 
decision based on the modelling error plus network sample-
and-hold quantization and jitter errors (Yout-Ynn). The detector 
gathers error data from the plant in each operation state 
during the secure operation phase. Assuming that the sum of 
errors have a Gaussian distribution in the system state 𝜓𝑖 , the 
detection thresholds are defined to be 𝜇𝑖 ± 𝛫𝜎𝑖 where 𝐾 is a 
constant and 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜎𝑖  are the Gaussian mean and standard 
deviation in 𝜓𝑖 , respectively. Therefore, the false positive 
probability will roughly be 2𝑄(𝐾) = 𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑐 (
𝐾
√2
). In a trade-
off with false negatives, K should be chosen so that the 
physical system operation is not affected much if a small 
attack is missed while significant deviations from the 
expected normal working condition (Ynn) are captured.  
Compensator. In our solution, the compensator is a robust 
controller and gets involved when IDS triggers a signal 
indicating an attack. To have a stable plant (system), using a 
compensator is necessary. For the attacks of signal 
amplification kind, we need to damp the resultant 
overshoot/undershoot in order to thwart the attack. 
Compensator’s involvement should be temporary and after the 
attack effect is gone, the main controller can take charge.    
The main controller usually has more design goals rather than 
just stabilizing the system. It could have been designed for e.g. 
a low steady state error. The steady state error is small or 
converges to zero if the compensator gain is increased, but it 
leads to an increase in overshoot/undershoot and hence, 
decreases the system stability. Therefore, both accuracy and 
stability can be realized when there is a suitable connection 
between the detector and compensator. 
In this paper, an RBF_NN is used as a compensating 
adaptive intelligent controller which is enabled when the 
detector signals an attack. Note that in intelligent SD attacks, 
the adversary has identified both the controller and the plant, 
and engineers the signal amplification gain in way that e.g. 
50% output overshoot is achieved. These temporary effects 
might be human-invisible but gradually degrade the physical 
system [27]. When IDS signals an attack, replacing the main 
controller (which has been identified by the attacker) with a 
robust and adaptive one can potentially limit the attack. 
Identification of an adaptive controller is not as easy as the 
classic ones like PID, and due to its short-term involvement, 
does not give much information to the attacker about its 
internals either. To achieve robustness against intelligent SD 
attacks of amplification kind, we propose a RBF-NN 
controller that is adapted by the sliding mode control (SMC) 
method. Using the SMC method to control the CPS system 
involves two steps;  
(1) Selecting an appropriate sliding surface such that the 
sliding motion on the sliding manifold is stable and ensures
lim ( ) 0
t
E t

 .  
 (2) Establishing a robust control law which guarantees the 
existence of the sliding manifold ( ) 0S t  .  
 The control goal is that the dynamic error converges to 
zero. The error is defined as follows. 
 (t) refe                                                                     (1) 
where ref  is the desired speed of the speed and   is the 
speed of the DC motor.  
The sliding surfaces are defined as in [29]: 
 
1
( ) ( )
n
d
S t e t
dt


 
  
 
                                                                         (2)       
where ( )S t R  and   is a real positive constant parameter.  
 In case the physical plant is a DC motor, one can define 
the sliding surface as follows: 
 (t) (t) (t)S e e                                                                        (3) 
where   is a real positive constant parameter and e(t) stands 
for the difference between the desired and current rotational 
speeds (rpm). The RBF-NN controller is designed to establish 
a robust control system that adapts using SMC’s stability 
theory. It guarantees the existence of the sliding surface which 
converges to ( ) 0S t  . 
RBF Neural Network. RBF-NN can be considered as one 
layer feed forward neural network with nonlinear elements. 
The RBF-NN does the mapping according to: 
 
1
( ) ( , , )
n
j j j j j
j
f z w G z m 

                                                       (4) 
where 1 2[ , ,..., ]
T n
nz z z z R  is the input, ( , , )
n
j j j jG z m R  , 
1,2,...,j n  are the Gaussian radial basis functions, j R  is 
the spread of the jth  Gaussian function, jm  is the mean value 
of that function and n is the number of neurons. Each 
Gaussian radial basis function can be written as: 
 
2
( , , ) exp
2
j j
j j j j
j
z c
G z c 

 
 
 
 
                                           (5) 
Notice that the optimal values may not be unique. In this 
study, c  and   are not trained. The input vector z is 1 2[ , ]S S  
and the RBF-NN output ( f ) is considered as the  control input 
( u ) sent to the plant via network. 
Learning Algorithm. The RBF-NN parameters are 
adjusted using SMC Lyapunov stability theory. Let us define 
the Lyapunov function as: 
 21( ) ( )
2
V t S t                                                                     (6)  
Differentiating Eq. (6) with respect to time, we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )V t S t S t                                                                (7) 
According to Lyapunov stability theory, the control system 
will asymptotically stabilize the error dynamics given in       
Eq. (3) and ( ) 0S t   if Eq. (7) is strictly negative. Applying 
an appropriate control input leads to achieving the mentioned 
condition. Let us define Eq. (7) as a cost function of RBF-NN 
controller. Hence, the cost function of RBF-NN controller is 
defined as follows.    
 (t) (t) (t)E S S                                                                             (8) 
Using Back-Propagation (BP) algorithm, the weighting vector 
of the RBF-NN is adjusted such that the cost function takes 
bigger negative values. This algorithm is written briefly as, 
 
(t)
( 1) ( )
(t)
RBF RBF
RBF
E
w t w t
w


  

                                       (9) 
where  and w represent the learning rate and tuning 
parameter of RBF-NNs, respectively. The gradient of E  with 
respect to the weighting vector w can be obtained as: 
  
 
 (t) (t)(t) (t)
(t)
(t) (t)RBF RBF RBF
S SE S
S
w w w
 
 
  
                           (10) 
Eq. (10) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
(t)(t) (t) (t)
(t)
(t) (t) (t) (t)
RBF
RBF RBF RBF
yE S u
S
w u y w
  

   
                           (11) 
Using Eq. (5), Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), Eq. (11) is simplified as: 
(t)
(t) ( (t), , )
(t)
RBF
RBF
E
S G z c
w




                                        (12) 
in which G is the value given in Eq. (5). Therefore, the 
adaptation law of RBF-NN is obtained as: 
 ( 1) ( ) ( , , )RBF RBF RBF j j jw t w t SG z c                             (13) 
where   is the learning rate of the RBF-NN controller. 
 
V. MODEL EVALUATION & SIMULATION RESULTS 
To evaluate the proposed SD-controller, we will employ 
it in a test system whose plant is a DC motor. The speed 
control of the DC motor will be carried out through a wireless 
network similar to Fig. 1. We will dedicate the next 
subsection to the introduction of this plant.  
A. Networked Speed Control of DC Motor 
A DC motor is a popular actuator in control systems. The 
electric circuit of the armature and the free-body diagram of 
the rotor is depicted in Fig. 2. The voltage source (V) is the 
system or control input applied to the armature of the motor. 
The rotational speed of the shaft ?̇? is the system output. It is 
assumed that the rotor and shaft are rigid. Also, it is assumed 
that the friction torque is proportional to shaft angular 
velocity. The system parameters are presented in Table. 1. 
The torque that a DC motor provides is proportional to the 
armature current and the strength of the magnetic field. In the 
model, it is assumed that the magnetic field is constant. 
Hence, the motor torque is only proportional to the armature 
current (i) by a constant parameter 𝑘𝑡 as shown below: 
 tT k i                                                
The back emf. ve is proportional to the angular velocity 
of the shaft by a constant parameter of 𝐾𝑒 as follows.  
e ev k                                                                             (15) 
Dynamic equations of the system using Newton's law 
and Kirchoff's law are as below, 
2
t2
1
( )
d d
k i b
J dtdt
 
                                                     (16) 
1
( )i e
di d
R V k
dt L dt

                                                   (17) 
In the model, the motor torque and back emf constants are 
equal. Therefore, 𝑘𝑡  represents both constants in Table. 1. 
The state space model of the DC motor according to Eq. (16) 
and Eq. (17) are presented as follows, 
 
0
1
1 0
b k
d J J
V
k Rdt i i
L
L L
y
i
 

 
                       
 
  
 
                                         (18) 
The transfer function of the system is obtained as follows, 
(s) 2 /
(s)
(s) (s 9.997)(s 2.003)
rad s
H
V V
  
      
             (19) 
Remark. To calculate Eq. (11), there is a term which depends 
on the system equations, which for DC motor becomes,   
(t)
(t)
tKS
u LJ

 

                                                                  (20) 
It is a constant value. However, in this study, we assume that 
the dynamic system equation is unknown. Thus, there is no 
information about this term and it is compensated by the 
learning rate (η) in Eq. (13).  
B. Simulation Results  
We test the intrusion detection and compensation system 
of ours on the DC motor described in the previous subsection.  
The simulator is MATLAB Simulink. We pick the Controlled 
Area Network (CAN) standard used in vehicles (including 
electric cars) to connect the controller and the plant. A 
modern automobile has as many as 70 Electric Control Units 
(ECU), some of which control transmission and electric 
power steering. The network rate is set to 240Kbps and the 
frame/message size is set to 80bits. This implies that the 
average rate of sending control signals as well as reading 
samples from the output sensor is 3000/s.  
To control the speed of the DC motor under normal 
conditions, a lag compensator is designed such that the 
system output tracks a step function. The designed PID 
controller is as follows, 
1
(s) 30
0.01
s
C
s


  
(21) 
Similar to [27], a covert SD attack of gain-multiplication 
kind is launched on the forward link. However, instead of 
merely targeting an overshoot of 50%, we tried attacking the 
system with a range of gains, including one that could create 
 
Fig. 2. The electronic circuit of the DC motor. 
TABLE 1. DEFAULT PARAMETERS OF THE DC MOTOR 
Parameter Description Value 
J inertia moment of the rotor 0.01 kg.m2 
b motor viscous friction constant     0.1 N.m.s 
ke electromotive force constant        0.01 V/rad/sec 
kt motor torque constant               0.01 N.m/Amp 
R electric resistance                 1 Ohm 
L electric inductance                 0.5 H 
 
  
such an overshoot. In the experiments, 𝜎 is set to 5 and all the 
attacks are launched at 𝑡 = 5. Fig. 3 shows the output of the 
system and the control signal in two scenarios. Each plot 
shows the case in which the IDS and compensator were not 
in place as well as the case they were in the circuit. In the 
normal operation, the motor speed rises sharply and gradually 
converges to one (i.e. the nominal speed) when a step like 
reference signal with the value of one is applied.   
  
  
  
   
Fig. 4. SD attack with a [gain of attack=5] applied on two systems, one 
with IDS and one without. The top plot shows the system output 
as well as the IDS flag, and the bottom plot shows the 
corresponding control signals. 
                  
     
Fig. 6. SD attack with a [gain of attack=120] applied on two systems, one 
with IDS and one without. The top plot shows the system output as 
well as the IDS flag, and the bottom plot shows the corresponding 
control signals. 
 
    
     
Fig. 3. SD attack with a [gain of attack=0.5] applied on two systems, 
one with IDS and one without. The top plot shows the system 
output as well as the IDS flag, and the bottom plot shows the 
corresponding control signals. 
    
     
Fig. 5. SD attack with a [gain of attack=15] applied on two systems, one 
with IDS and one without. The top plot shows the system output 
as well as the IDS flag, and the bottom plot shows the 
corresponding control signals. 
 
 
  
When there is no IDS or compensator, the attacker manages 
to bring the rotor speed (temporarily) down by 20% when he 
applies a gain of 0.5 on the forward link signals. This value 
is less with the IDS and compensator involved. Note that IDS 
has correctly detected the anomaly in the motor speed at 𝑡 =
5.07𝑠 and switched the controllers. The output gain of 0.5 for 
the IDS flag is merely for better demonstration of its output. 
Fig. 4 shows a similar attack but with a gain of 5. This 
time we have an overshoot of around 30% in the motor speed.  
However, with IDS and the subsequent compensation, it was 
reduced to less than 10%. Similarly, in Fig. 5, there was an 
overshoot of 50% when the attacker applied a gain of 15 on 
an unprotected system. But it was mitigated to a value as low 
as 17% in a setup with IDS and compensator.  
The lower plots show the corresponding control signals 
in each case. As it can be seen, sometimes compensation of 
the attack required very high and very low spike-like 
reactions in the control/input voltage. This is unavoidable if 
the attack is as huge as the ones tested here. However, in 
practice, there might be a limit on the input range of the DC 
motor which limits the range of compensation.  
Fig. 6 reports an interesting phenomenon. The excessive 
gain the attacker has applied (i.e. 120) made the system 
completely unstable. This is obvious from the oscillating 
output of the system. Such attacks can cause permanent 
damages. However, the system with IDS and compensator 
managed to keep the system stable. The overshoot is less than 
100%, which is better than having an unstable system. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, we studied the problem of detecting stealth 
deception intrusions in cyber physical systems. We proposed 
that an identifier learns the plant and predicts its outputs. An 
IDS compares the actual plant outputs with those of the 
identifier that received the same control inputs. Normal 
prediction error patterns are learnt during the learning phase. 
Anomalies in error are captured by statistical measures and 
raise a flag which in turn switches the controller to a more 
robust one. Simulation results on a DC motor show that the 
proposed approach is effective in the sense that it both 
achieves detecting the attacks of amplification type and 
alleviating their effect on the plant.  
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